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Abstract. Previous research into the relation between ASP and classi-
cal logic has identified at least two different ways in which the former
extends the latter. First, ASP program typically contain sets of rules that
can be naturally interpreted as inductive definitions, and the language
FO(ID) has shown that such inductive definitions can elegantly be added
to classical logic in a modular way. Second, there is of course also the
well-known epistemic component of ASP, which was mainly emphasized
in the early papers on stable model semantics. To investigate whether
this kind of knowledge can also, and in a similarly modular way, be added
to classical logic, the language of Ordered Epistemic Logic was presented
in recent work. However, this logic views the epistemic component as en-
tirely separate from the inductive definition component, thus ignoring
any possible interplay between the two. In this paper, we present a lan-
guage that extends the inductive definition construct found in FO(ID)
with an epistemic component, making such interplay possible. The even-
tual goal of this work is to discover whether it is really appropriate to
view the epistemic component and the inductive definition component
of ASP as two separate extensions of classical logic, or whether there is
also something of importance in the combination of the two.
1 Introduction
Today, Answer Set Programming (ASP) is a vibrant domain, boasting both
mature technologies and successful real-world applications. The roots of ASP lie
in the fields of Logic Programming (LP) and Non-monotonic Reasoning (NMR).
Both of these were initially motivated by dissatisfaction with classical first-order
logic (FO), be it its computational properties (in the case of LP) or its suitability
for representing common-sense knowledge (in the case of NMR). The current
success of ASP suggests that, to a large extent, this domain was indeed able to
overcome these problems of classical logic.
It is, however, not yet quite clear how precisely this was done. That is to
say, the relation between ASP and classical logic is, in our opinion, not yet fully
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understood. Currently, ASP still stands as an alternative to FO: to effectively
write ASP programs, one basically has to leave behind all methodologies, tools
and intuitive understandings of classical logic and start anew in a different set-
ting. This paper is part of a research project that attempts to close this gap [10].
The aim is to investigate whether and how the achievements of ASP can be re-
formulated as modular improvements or extensions of classical logic. Ultimately,
we would like to be able to characterize ASP as a set of specific solutions to
a number of orthogonal problems/limitations of classical logic, such that some-
one working in classical logic could add as many or as few “ASP-style features”
to his knowledge base as is needed for that particular application. Of course,
the motivation for this research is not purely practical. By reformulating the
contributions of ASP in the classical framework, we also hope to provide a syn-
thesis that will eventually lead to an increased understanding of classical and
computational logic, and their role in problem solving.
Ironically, ASP’s relation to classical logic seems currently best understood
when it comes to computational aspects. For instance, [20] showed that the
typical ASP way of encoding search problems can be captured quite elegantly
in a classical context by the notion of modal expansion: given a theory T in
an alphabet Σ and an interpretation Io for some subvocabulary Σo ⊆ Σ, find
an interpretation I that extends Io to the entire vocabulary such that I |= T .
Indeed, the 2011 edition of the ASP-competition [9] has had two modal expansion
systems for (extensions of) classical logic among its competitors: Enfragmo [1]
and IDP [19]. On a more technical level, also the similarities between current
ASP solvers and SAT solvers are of course well understood (e.g., [16,11,15]).
When it comes to the knowledge representation properties of ASP (i.e., the
intuitive meaning of expressions and the modeling methodologies that have to
be followed), the relation to classical logic is less clear. As pointed out by [5],
one of the key problems lies in the interpretation of the semantic structures:
whereas an answer set in ASP is traditionally interpreted in an epistemic way, as
a representation of the knowledge of some rational agent, classical logic is based
on the Tarskian view of a model as a representation of a possible objective state
of affairs. Nevertheless, a series of papers by Denecker et al. [4,8,7] has shown
that a substantial portion of ASP can be understood as a combination of classical
FO axioms and inductive definitions.
An inductive definitions is a well-understood mathematical construct, that
is usually represented by a set of natural language if-then-statements. As shown
in [4,8,7], we can view a set of normal logic programming rules as a formal
representation of such an inductive definition. For instance, the following pair of
rules: {
T (x, y)← T (x, z) ∧ T (z, y).
T (x, y)← E(x, y).
}
define T as the transitive closure of E. This is of course not overly surprising and
it indeed goes back to the views of Van Gelder [21] and Clark [2]. Nevertheless,
taking this observation seriously immediately suggests a clean and well-defined
“plugin” that can modularly add an ASP-style component to a classical FO the-
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ory. Indeed, because an inductive definition is nothing more than a generalization
of the way in which relations are usually (non-inductively) defined by means of
an FO equivalence, there should be nothing problematic (either conceptually or
mathematically) about allowing such “sets of rules that form an inductive defini-
tion” anywhere one is allowed to use an equivalence. FO(ID) (previously known
as ID-logic) is the language that does precisely this: it extends FO, in a com-
pletely modular way, with a rule-based representation for inductive definition
[3]. Representing a search problem as a model expansion problem in FO(ID) of-
ten yields results that are almost identical to a Generate-Define-Test program in
ASP [17], apart from minor syntactic details [18,5]. In this way, FO(ID) there-
fore fits nicely into our stated goal, by identifying one concrete way in which
ASP improves upon FO and packing this up in a language construct that can
be added to an existing FO knowledge base at will.
While FO(ID) seems able to naturally represent already a surprisingly large
part of existing ASP practice, it by no means covers everything. One class of
examples that remains out of scope is that of the epistemic examples that orig-
inally motivated the stable model semantics [12,13]. This is epitomized by the
well-known interview example [14], which is expressed in ASP as:
Eligible(x)← HighGPA(x).
Eligible(x)←Minority(x), FairGPA(x).
¬Eligible(x)← ¬FairGPA(x).
Interview(x)← not Eligible(x), not ¬Eligible(x).
Recent efforts have attempted to reformulate also this kind of example in a way
that explains its relation to FO. In [23], the language of Ordered Epistemic Logic
(OEL) is developed for this. Here, an ordered set of FO theories is considered,
and each theory T is allowed to make use of modal operators KT ′ that refer to
the knowledge entailed by a theory T ′ < T . The interview example would consist
of two theories T1, T2 with T1 < T2, such that T1 is a normal FO knowledge base
containing facts about Minority, HighGPA and FairGPA, and a definition of
Eligible. The theory T2 consists of the single equivalence:
∀x Interview(x)⇔ ¬KT1Eligible(x) ∧ ¬KT1Eligible(x).
This logic extends FO in a way which is completely orthogonal to FO(ID).
There is nothing to prevent the different knowledge bases of an OEL theory
from containing, in addition to regular FO formulas, also inductive definitions,
but if they do, there is no interplay with the epistemic operators. In other words,
FO(ID) and OEL both isolate one particular non-classical aspect of ASP, and
show how it can be modularly added to FO, but they do so independently.
This presupposes that there is nothing of importance in ASP’s combination of
epistemic and “inductive definition” reasoning. However, it does not seem a
priori obvious that this is the case.
In this paper, we will therefore investigate how an epistemic component can
be added to the inductive definition construct of FO(ID) itself. The key idea
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here is to allow both a relation and an agent’s knowledge about this relation
to be defined together in a single knowledge producing definition, as we will
call it. The semantics of such a knowledge producing definition is defined by a
constructive process that creates, in parallel, the relations that are being defined
and the agent’s knowledge about them. In this way, we obtain a language in
which, unlike the FO(ID)+OEL approach, interaction between the epistemic
and definitional component is possible. The hope is that such a language might
shed more light on the epistemic component of ASP and its relation to both
classical FO and the inductive definitions of FO(ID).
The work presented in this paper is still at a preliminary stage, but we will
attempt to sketch interesting avenues for future research. Because one of our
main design goals is to make our approximate knowledge structures integrate
seamlessly with the inductive definition construct as it already exists in FO(ID),
we will need to spend some time recalling the details of this, before we can
develop our extension.
2 Preliminaries: the semantics of inductive definitions
Inductive definitions are constructive. In mathematical texts, they are typically
represented by a set of if-then statements, which may be applied to add new
elements to the relation(s) that is (or are, in the case of a definition by simul-
taneous induction) being defined. The formal representation of such a definition
in FO(ID) is by a set of rules of the form
∀x P (t)← φ, (1)
where P (t) is an atom and φ an FO formula.For monotone definitions, the re-
lation being defined is simply the least relation that is closed under application
of the rules, and it can be constructed by exhaustively applying them. For non-
monotone definitions, the relation being defined is no longer the least relation
closed under the rules, and there may, in fact, be many minimal relations closed
under the rules instead of a single least one. In mathematical texts, such a non-
monotone definition is always accompanied by a well-founded order over which
the induction is performed. While the characterization as a least set breaks
down, the constructive characterization still works: the defined relation can still
be constructed by repeated application of the rules, provided that these rules
are applied in an order that respects the given well-founded order of induction.
For instance, the standard definition of satisfaction in classical logic is a defi-
nition over the subformula order, which means that we may only apply a rule
that derives that I |= φ for some φ after all rules that could derive I |= ψ for a
subformula ψ of φ have been applied.
Of course, for a correct inductive definition, it is important that the structure
of the rules also respects the well-founded order. For instance, in an definition
over the subformula order, it makes no sense for a rule to define whether a
formula is satisfied in terms of the satisfaction of a larger formula. Therefore,
the structure of the rules and the well-founded order are not independent. In
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fact, the well-founded order is already entirely implicit in the structure of the
rules! As shown in [8] and a series of prior papers, the well-founded semantics
(WFS) [22] can actually be seen as a mathematical construct to recover the
well-founded order from the structure of the rules.
For simplicity, in the technical material of this paper, we will restrict attention
to ground formulas only.
Since its original definition, a number of alternative ways of defining the
WFS have been developed. One of these is to start from the following method
of evaluating a formula φ in a pair of interpretations (I, J):
– For an atom P (t), (I, J) |= P (t) iff I |= P (t),
– For a formula ¬ψ, (I, J) |= ¬ψ iff (J, I) 6|= ψ,
– For a formula ψ1 ∨ ψ2, (I, J) |= ψ1 ∨ ψ2 iff (I, J) |= ψ1 or (I, J) |= ψ2,
– For a formula ψ1 ∧ ψ2, (I, J) |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iff (I, J) |= ψ1 and (I, J) |= ψ2.
The crux of this definition lies in the case for negation, which switches the roles
of I and J , thus ensuring that positive occurrences of atoms are evaluated in
I and negative occurrences in J . We will call a pair (I, J) for which I ≤ J an
approximating pair, because it can be seen as an approximation of the set of
interpretations K such that I ≤ K and K ≤ J . Indeed, if (I, J) |= φ, according
to the above definition, then K |= φ for all such K. Moreover, if K |= φ for
at least one such K, then (J, I) |= φ. For pairs (I, J) such that I = J , the
evaluation (I, J) |= φ reduces to classical satisfaction I |= φ. Pairs for which this
is the case are called total.
The WFS can then be defined as the unique limit of a sequence of pairs
of interpretations (Ii, Ji)i≥0. This sequence starts from the least precise pair of
interpretations (⊥Σ ,>Σ), where ⊥Σ is the interpretation in which all atoms is
false and >Σ the interpretation in which all atoms are true. There are then two
acceptable ways of going from (Ii, Ji) to (Ii+1, Ji+1):
– Either Ji+1 = Ji and Ii+1 is the union Ii + {P (t)}, with P (t) an atom for
which there exists a rule of the form P (t)← φ with (Ii, Ji) |= φ;
– Or Ii+1 = Ii and Ji+1 is such that Ii ≤ Ji+1 ≤ Ji and for all atoms P (t) in
the set difference Ji − Ji+1 and all rules P (t)← φ, (Ji+1, Ii) 6|= φ
Intuitively, the first of these two cases allows us to derive the head of a rule
once it is certain that its body is satisfied (in the sense that K |= φ for all K
approximated by (Ii, Ji)). The second case allows us to assume that a set of
atoms must all be false if this assumption would make us certain that all bodies
φ of rules with one of these atoms in the head are false (i.e., K 6|= φ for all K
approximated by (Ii, Ji+1)). The set Ji+1 − Ji of atoms that are falsified in this
operation is known as an unfounded set.
A sequence constructed in this way is called an induction sequence. The well-
founded model (WFM) is now precisely the unique limit (V,W ) to which all
such induction sequences converge. If this WFM is total (i.e., V = W ), then
the definition completely determines the extension of the predicates it defines.
Clearly, this is a desirable property for an inductive definition. Therefore, FO(ID)
allows only total models.
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So far, we have tacitly assumed that all predicates in the vocabulary Σ are
defined by the definition. In mathematics, however, this is rarely the case, since
most definitions serve to define some relation(s) in terms of some other rela-
tion(s). This is also possible in FO(ID). For a definition ∆ (i.e., a set of rules
of form (1)), the predicate symbols appearing in the head of at least one of
these rules are called the defined predicates of ∆. The set of all defined predi-
cates is denoted as Def(∆). The remaining predicates (i.e., those that belong
to Σ − Def(∆)) are called open, and the set of all such predicates is denoted
by Op(∆). The purpose of a definition is then to characterize the defined predi-
cates Def(∆) in terms of the open predicates Op(∆). Formally, this is done by
parametrizing the construction process by an interpretation for the open predi-
cates: for an interpretation O of Op(∆), an induction sequence given O is defined
as a sequence of interpretation (Ii, Ji)i≥0, in which all interpretations Ii and Ji
extend the given interpretation O. The starting point of this sequence is the pair
(I0, J0) such that I0 = O +⊥Def(∆) and J0 = O +>Def(∆).
An interpretation I is then called a model of a definition ∆, denoted I |= ∆,
if the unique limit of the induction sequences for ∆ given I|Op(∆) (i.e., the
restriction of I to the open predicates of ∆) is precisely the total pair (I, I).
FO(ID) now consists of classical first-order logic FO extended with these def-
initions. While some versions of this logic allow boolean combinations of classical
formulas and inductive definitions, we will, for simplicity, restrict attention in
this paper to FO(ID) theories that consist of precisely one FO formula φ and
one inductive definition ∆. For such a theory T = {φ,∆}, we define that I is a
model of T , denoted I |= T , iff both I |= φ (in the classical sense) and I |= ∆
(as defined above).
3 Knowledge producing definitions
The goal of this paper is take the concept of an inductive definition as it exists in
FO(ID) and extend it by allowing definitions that not only define the objective
extension of their defined predicates, but, at the same time, also define a rational
agent’s knowledge about these predicates. A modal literal is a formula of the
form Kψ where ψ is an FO formula. By FO(K), we denote the language that
extends FO by allowing modal literals to appear anywhere an atom P (t) may
appear. Note that FO(K) therefore does not allow nesting of the operator K. A
knowledge producing definition κ is a set of rules of either the form
∀x Kψ ← φ, (2)
or
∀x P (t)← φ. (3)
Here, Kψ is a modal literal and P (t) an atom. In both cases, φ is an FO(K)
formula. Again, in our formal treatment, we will always assume that these rules
have already been appropriately grounded. The defined predicates of a knowledge
producing definition κ are all the predicates P that appear in the head of a rule
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of form (3). All other predicates, including those that appear only in the formula
ψ of a rule of form (2), are open.
For this formalism, the basic semantic structure will consist of a pair of an
interpretation I, representing the real world, and a set of interpretations W ,
representing the agent’s knowledge about the world. We call such a pair (I,W )
a knowledge structure and call it consistent if I ∈W . It is obvious how to evaluate
a knowledge formula in such a knowledge structure.
Definition 1. For a knowledge formula φ and a knowledge structure S = (I,W ),
we define S |= φ as follows:
– For an atom P (t), S |= P (t) iff I |= P (t),
– For a modal literal Kψ, S |= Kψ iff for each J in W , (J,W ) |= ψ,
– The other cases are defined as usual.
Like the WFS, which construct a single interpretation K through a series
of increasingly precise approximations by pairs of interpretations (Ii, Ji), our
semantics will construct a single knowledge structure (I,W ) through a series
of increasingly precise approximations of it. Part of these approximations will
again be a pair of interpretations (Ii, Ji), which form an increasingly precise
sequence of approximations of the real extension K of the defined predicates.
At each stage of this approximating sequence, we will also keep track of the
agent’s knowledge about it. Therefore, at each step i, we will also have a set
Wi of pairs of interpretations; if (I ′, J ′) ∈ Wi, then this means that the agent
considers it possible that (I ′, J ′) occurs somewhere in the real approximating
sequence. The way in which we will ensure this property, is to, on the one hand,
apply the same derivation rules we apply to the real sequence to the pairs that
the agent considers possible. On the other hand, when the agent’s knowledge
increases due to a modal literal in the head of a rule, this will eliminate some of
the possibilities (i.e., some of these pairs (I ′, J ′) are removed from Wi), but it
will not change any of the possibilities themselves (i.e., the remaining pairs do
not change).
The following will serve as our basic semantic structure.
Definition 2. An approximate knowledge structure A is a pair ((I, J),W) of
an approximating pair (I, J) and a set W of approximating pairs (I ′, J ′).
Evaluating an FO(K) formula in such an approximate knowledge structure
is again a matter of switching the approximating pairs when negation is en-
countered. Formally, we define that, for an approximate knowledge structure
A = ((I, J),W),
– For an atom P (t), A |= P (t) iff I |= P (t);
– For a modal literal Kψ, A |= Kψ iff for each (I ′, J ′) ∈ W, ((I ′, J ′),W) |= ψ;
– For a formula ¬φ, A |= ¬φ iff ((J, I),W) |= φ, where W = {(J ′, I ′) |
(I ′, J ′) ∈ W};
– The other cases are defined as usual.
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We now construct an increasingly precise sequence (Ai)i≥0 of approximate
knowledge structures. If we project this sequence unto the approximating pair
(I, J) of each approximate knowledge structures ((I, J),W), the result will es-
sentially be just a regular induction sequence. The sequence again takes as input
a knowledge structure (O,M) for the open predicates, and its starting point is
then the approximate knowledge structure
A0 = ((O +⊥Def(κ), O +>Def(κ)), {(O′ +⊥Def(κ), O′ +>Def(κ)) | O′ ∈M}).
We construct subsequent elements of the sequence by applying one of the fol-
lowing operations.
Operation 1. Ai+1 = ((Ii + {P (t)}, Ji),Wi) where Ai = ((Ii, Ji),Wi) such
that there is a rule r of the form P (t)← φ with ((Ii, Ji),Wi) |= φ.
This operation is just the obvious analogue to the first operation used in building
normal induction sequences. The only difference is that the agent’s knowledgeWi
is dragged along as an additional argument, which is used to evaluate occurrences
of modal literals in the rule bodies.
Operation 2. Ai+1 = ((Ii, Ji),Wi+1) where Ai = ((Ii, Ji),Wi) and Wi+1 =
Wi − {(I ′i, J ′i)} + {(I ′i + {P (t)}, Ji)} such that there is a rule r of the form
P (t)← φ with ((I ′i, J ′i),Wi) |= φ.
This operation is essentially the same as the previous one, with the only differ-
ence being that it is now not applied to the approximating pair (Ii, Ji), but to
one of the approximating pairs (I ′i, J
′
i) inWi. Where the previous two operations
are analogous to the production operation of the normal induction sequence, the
next two mimic the unfounded set operation.
Operation 3. Ai+1 = ((Ii, Ji+1),Wi) where Ai = ((Ii, Ji),Wi) and Ji+1 is
such that Ii ≤ Ji+1 ≤ Ji and for all atoms P (t) ∈ Ji − Ji+1 and all rules r
of the form P (t)← φ, it holds that (Ji+1, Ii) 6|= φ.
Again, this operation can either be performed on the approximating pair (Ii, Ji),
as above, or on one of the pairs in the set Wi, as below:
Operation 4. Or Ai+1 = ((Ii, Ji),Wi+1) where Ai = ((Ii, Ji),Wi) andWi+1 =
Wi−{(I ′i, J ′i)}+{(I ′i, J ′i+1)} and J ′i+1 is such that I ′i ≤ J ′i+1 ≤ J ′i and for all
atoms P (t) ∈ J ′i − J ′i+1 and all rules r of the form P (t) ← φ, it holds that
((J ′i+1, I
′
i),Wi) 6|= φ.
The final operation takes care of the effect of knowledge producing rules.
Operation 5. Ai+1 = ((Ii, Ji),Wi+1) where Ai = ((Ii, Ji),Wi) and Wi+1 =
{(I, J) ∈ Wi | (J, I) |= ψ} and there exists a rule r of the form Kψ ← φ
such that ((Ii, Ji),Wi) |= φ.
Note that the condition for removing a pair (I, J) fromWi is that (J, I) 6|= ψ,
i.e., that no interpretation approximated by (I, J) still satisfies ψ.
The semantics of a knowledge producing definition is now defined in terms
of sequences that are constructed by these operations.
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Definition 3. Let κ by a knowledge producing definition. Let (O,M) be a knowl-
edge structure describing the agent’s initial knowledge about the open predicates.
A knowledge derivation sequence is a sequence (Ai)i≥0 of approximate knowledge
structures, starting from
A0 = ((O +⊥Def(κ), O +>Def(κ)), {(O′ +⊥Def(κ), O′ +>Def(κ)) | O′ ∈M}),
such that each Ai+1 is obtained from Ai by applying one of the five operations
defined above and, to prevent the same operation from being applied again and
again, Ai+1 6= Ai. Such a sequence is called complete if there is no way to extend
it further without violating this condition. It is called sound if every operation
that is used to construct Ai+1 from Ai remains applicable in all Aj with j > i. It
is called total if it terminates in an approximate knowledge structure ((I, J),W)
such that I = J and for each (I ′, J ′) ∈ W also I ′ = J ′.
The condition of totality is borrowed from FO(ID), where, as mentioned, it
is used to ensure that each inductive definition correctly and completely defines
the relations it sets out to define. It is therefore also a natural requirement in
our context.
The condition of soundness is meant to avoid situations in which the sequence
ends up contradicting itself, as it might for the following example:
{Kp← ¬Kp.}
Here, the fact that the agent does not know p will produce the knowledge that p.
This is not only conceptually problematic, but also creates the practical problem
that the order in which operations are applied might have an effect on the final
outcome. For instance, the knowledge definition{
Kq ← ¬Kp.
Kp← ¬Kq.
}
has both a derivation sequence that starts with the first rule and therefore ends
up knowing q but not knowing p, and one that starts with the second rule and
ends up knowing p but not q.
This can only happen with sequences that are not sound, as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 1. All complete and sound knowledge derivation sequences that
start from the same knowledge structure (O,M) terminate in the same approx-
imate knowledge structure A.
Proof (sketch). At any particular point in the derivation sequence, many opera-
tion may be applicable. We have to show that it does not matter which of these
we choose. First, because the sequence is sound, we know that even if we do
not choose to apply an operation now, we will always get a chance to apply it
later. Second, the effect of an operation usually does not depend on when it is
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executed. The only exception to this is Operation 5, because the set of approxi-
mating pairs may of course change throughout the sequence. However, the only
changes to this set are that (1) pairs are removed and that (2) pairs become more
precise (i.e., that either the first element I of a pair (I, J) becomes larger or that
J becomes smaller, so that fewer interpretations K lie between I and J). Clearly,
(1) is not a problem, because if a pair gets removed later on any way, it does not
matter if we already remove it now or not. Also (2) is not a problem, because the
condition for removing a pair (I, J), namely that (J, I) 6|= φ, also implies that,
for any more precise pair (I ′, J ′) (i.e., such that I ≤ I ′ and J ′ ≤ J), it will be
the case that (J ′, I ′) 6|= φ as well. The only effect of postponing the application
of an Operation 5 to a later stage is therefore that we might end up removing
more pairs than if we had applied it now. However, if we apply the operation
now, then at the later stage we will have another Operation 5 available, namely
the one that removes precisely those pairs that form the difference. Since this
operation will remain applicable and therefore must eventually be applied, the
end result will be the same.
uunionsq
Moreover, the only way in which it is possible to obtain unsound derivations
is by negated modal literals.
Proposition 2. For a knowledge producing definition in which each body of
a rule contain only positive occurrences of modal literals Kψ, each knowledge
derivation sequence is sound.
Proof (sketch). The differences between one approximate knowledge structure
Ai = ((Ii, Ji),Wi) and an approximate knowledge structure Aj = ((Ij , Jj),Wj)
that occurs later in the derivation sequence are:
– Ii ≤ Ij and Jj ≤ Ji: this implies that whenever ((Ii, Ji),W) |= φ for some
W and φ, also ((Ij , Jj),W) |= φ
– Wj consists of pairs (I ′j , J ′j) for which there exists a corresponding pair
(I ′i, J
′
i) ∈ Wi such that, again, I ′i ≤ I ′j and J ′j ≤ J ′i , and therefore when-
ever ((I ′i, J
′
i),W) |= φ also ((I ′j , J ′j),W) |= φ
– for some (I ′j , J
′
j) ∈ Wj , there may not exist a corresponding pair in Wi
Putting the second and third point together, it is obvious thatWj always knows
everything that Wi knows, and possibly more. Therefore, only rule bodies con-
taining a negative occurrence of a modal literal may becomes false in Wj after
they were true in Wi.
uunionsq
This result seems to suggest that it might be possible to impose syntactic
constraints on a knowledge producing definition to ensure that it only has sound
derivations, by limiting the way in which negated modal literals are allowed to
appear. However, it is not enough to, e.g., just require that these definitions are
stratified, because gaining new knowledge about one predicate may have “side
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effects” where also knowledge about another predicate is produced. For instance,
consider the following definition which, at first sight, contains no cycles at all:
q ← p.
Kq ← r.
r ← ¬Kp.

Even though there are no syntactic cycles, once the agent learns q, this will also
produce the knowledge that p (since q is only true in worlds where p also holds).
Because of the ¬Kp in the body of the rule for r, this will lead to an unsound
derivation.
Our approach in this paper will be to ignore the existence of unsound deriva-
tions and view the unique limit of the sound derivations as the semantics of
a knowledge producing definition—at least, if this unique limit is total. If the
limit is not total (given a particular knowledge structure S for the open predi-
cates), then, just like in FO(ID), the knowledge producing definition simply has
no models (for that particular S). If no sound derivations exists (for that S),
then again the knowledge producing definition has no models (for that S).
4 Adding knowledge producing definitions to FO
The previous section defined the concept of a knowledge producing definition
in isolation. Of course, our goal is to add this construct to FO(K), in the same
way as FO(ID) has added inductive definitions to FO. We will again consider
only theories of the form T = {φ, κ}, were φ is now an FO(K) formula and κ a
knowledge producing definition. We define that a consistent knowledge structure
S = (I,W ) is a weak model of T if S |= φ and the approximate knowledge struc-
ture ((I, I), {(J, J) | J ∈ W}) is the unique total limit of each sound derivation
sequence that starts from (I|Op(κ), {L|Op(κ) | L ∈W}).
A problem with these weak models is they might contain knowledge that is
not warranted. Consider, for instance, the following example:
{q ← Kp} .
Here, there is no reason at all for knowing p, yet this knowledge producing
definition has a weak model ({p, q}, {{p, q}}). To avoid such models, we introduce
the following concept.
Definition 4. Let T = {φ, κ}, were φ is an FO(K) formula and κ a knowl-
edge producing definition. A knowledge structure S = (I,W ) is a strong model
of T , denoted S |= T , if S |= φ and the approximate knowledge structure
((I, I), {(J, J) | J ∈ W}) is the unique total limit of each sound derivation
sequence that starts from (I|Op(κ), O) where O is the set of all L|Op(κ) such that
there exists a W ′ for which (L,W ′) is a weak model of T .
By always using the set O as the set of possible worlds for the open predi-
cates, this definition prevents the knowledge producing definition from arbitrarily
knowing more about its open predicates than it should.
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5 Examples
In the logic we have now defined, it is straightforward to represent the Interview
example.{
Eligible(x)← (HighGPA(x) ∨ (Minority(x) ∧ FairGPA(x)).
Interview(x)← ¬K Eligible(x) ∧ ¬K ¬Eligible(x).
}
∀x HighGPA(x)⇔ x = Mary.
∀x FairGPA(x)⇔ x = John.
Minority(Mary).
Here, the soundness condition on the derivation sequence means that we first
have to apply the first rule of the knowledge producing definition to exhaustion,
before starting with the second rule. There are two possible interpretations for
the open predicates of the definition that satisfy the FO part of the theory:
O1 = {HighGPA(Mary), FairGPA(John),Minority(Mary)},
O2 = {HighGPA(Mary), FairGPA(John),Minority(Mary),Minority(John)}.
Each strong model will therefore have to be produced by a derivation sequence
in which W0 = {O1, O2} is used as the agent’s knowledge about the open pred-
icates. Let us first consider a sound derivation sequence that interprets the
open predicates by the knowledge structure S1 = (O1,W0). The first step is
A0 = (A, {A,B}) with:
A = (O1 +⊥Def(κ), O1 +>Def(κ))
B = (O2 +⊥Def(κ), O2 +>Def(κ))
In the approximating pair A, we can apply the first rule of the knowledge pro-
ducing definition to derive that Eligible(Mary), and we can also apply an un-
founded set operation to derive that Eligible(John) is false. This leads to the
new approximating pair (we abbreviate the names of the predicates):
A′ = (O1 + {Elig(Mary)}, O1 + {Elig(Mary), Int(Mary), Int(John)})
In the approximating pair B, on the other hand, we can derive that both
Eligible(John) and Eligible(Mary). This leads to the new pair:
B′ = (O2 + {Elig(Mary), Elig(John)},
O2 + {Elig(Mary), Elig(John), Int(Mary), Int(John)})
After applying these six operations (two times two for A, and two for B) to the
approximate knowledge structure W0, we will therefore eventually end up in
W6 = (A′, {A′, B′})
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Now, {A′, B′} |= K Elig(Mary), because Elig(Mary) holds in both underesti-
matesO1+{Elig(Mary)} andO2+{Elig(Mary), Elig(John)}. Also, {A′, B′} |=
¬K Elig(John), since Elig(John) does not hold in the overestimate (the nega-
tion switches the pairs) ofA′, namelyO1+{Elig(Mary), Int(Mary), Int(John)}.
Finally, {A′, B′} |= ¬K ¬Elig(John) holds as well, since Elig(John) does not
belong to the underestimate (the two negations switch the pairs twice) of A′,
namely O1 + {Elig(Mary)}. Therefore, we can apply to both A′ and B′ an un-
founded set operation (Operations 3 and 4) to derive that Mary should not be
interviewed, and we can apply the last rule of the definition to derive that John
should. After six more steps (two times two for A′, and two for B′), we therefore
end up in the limit W9 = (A′′, {A′′, B′′}), where
A′′ =(I, I) with I = O1 + {Elig(Mary), Int(John)}
B′′ =(J, J) with J = O1 + {Elig(Mary), Elig(John), Int(John)}
This structure is total and therefore the single knowledge structure (I, {I, J})
that it approximates is a model of this theory. By a similar reasoning, there is
also a second model, namely (J, {I, J}).
5.1 Another version of the Interview example
In the above version of this example, we are basically already encoding the solu-
tion to the problem by ordering the agent to interview everyone whose eligibility
is not known. Using a knowledge producing definition, however, it is also possible
to let the semantics do more of the work.

Eligible(x)← (HighGPA(x) ∨ (Minority(x) ∧ FairGPA(x)).
K Minority(x)← Interview(x) ∧Minority(x).
K ¬Minority(x)← Interview(x) ∧ ¬Minority(x).

(∀x HighGPA(x)⇔ x = Mary) ∧ (∀x FairGPA(x)⇔ x = John) ∧Minority(Mary).
∀x K Eligible(x) ∨K ¬Eligible(x).
Here, we are just telling the agent that the action of interviewing a can-
didate will reveal his minority status, without explicitly saying who should be
interviewed. The FO(K) constraint then orders the agent to make sure that for
each candidate, it is known whether he is eligible of not. Generating models for
this theory will then correctly produce plans in which people whose minority
status is unknown will be interviewed.
5.2 Sensing actions
A successful application area of ASP is planning. This also falls naturally in the
scope of FO(ID), since theories in the situation or event calculus are essentially
just an inductive definition of the values of the fluents at different points in time
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[6]. Here is an example of a theory in FO(ID) that represents a small action
domain in which there is a dirty glass that can be cleaned by wiping it.
{
Clean(t+ 1)←Wipe(t) ∨ Clean(t).
Clean(0)← InitClean.
}
¬InitClean
If the agent now does not know whether the glass is initially clean, we may be
interested in finding a plan that will allow it to know with certainty that it will
be clean at a certain point in time. This can be accomplished by just adding, e.g.,
K Clean(2) as an FO(K) constraint to the theory. More interestingly, knowledge
producing definitions can also be used to add sensing actions, such as an action
Inspect that allows the agent to discover whether the glass is clean.

Clean(t+ 1)←Wipe(t) ∨ Clean(t).
Clean(0)← InitClean.
K Clean(t+ 1)← Inspect ∧ Clean(t).
K ¬Clean(t+ 1)← Inspect ∧ ¬Clean(t).

K Clean(2).
6 Discussion
ASP is able to express epistemic examples by interpreting an answer set as a
set of literals that are believed by a rational agent. This is one of the most
radical ways in which ASP departs from classical logic, in which models or
interpretations always represent the objective state of the world. In the classical
setting, one typically resorts to sets of interpretations (or the related concept of
a Kripke structure) to represent beliefs.
In order to relate this aspect of ASP to classical logic, or to even integrate
the two, it is necessary to construct a formalisation which sticks to these classical
semantics objects. In this paper, we have introduced knowledge producing defini-
tions for this purpose. As our examples have shown, these are able to mimic the
ASP representation of, e.g., the Interview example, while at the same time also
introducing some interesting new possibilities, such as the ability to distinguish
between some atom P (t) becoming objectively true (by having P (t) in the head
of a rule) and the agent learning this atom (by having K P (t) in the head).
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